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A "CONTINGENCY PLAN" OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVE 
TO LIMIT U.S. REPRODUCTION 
William G. Hollingsworth* 
Unfortunately, the most disturbing problems that will arise from a 
larger population are probably not amenable to technological solutions. 
As he populates more and more of the earth, man will have to eliminate 
all forms of wildlife that would compete with him for space and for food; 
he will increasingly have to fiood deserts and fell forests in order to 
create more farmland, factories, houses, and roads; he will tolerate wild 
animals, wild plants, and wild landscapes only to the extent that they 
serve his needs. Highways, factories, and dwellings will occupy much of 
the scenery; all natural resources, including water, will have to be care-
fully husbanded. Man will thus destroy all the aspects of the environ-
ment under which he evolved as a species and which have created his 
present biological being. I 
I. RATIONALE-WHAT GOALS AND WHY? 
In 1976, human population on this planet passed the four billion 
mark and presently is believed to be increasing by something like 
"only" 1.7 percent per year-a growth rate that, if continued, would 
cause humankind to double its numbers about every 41 years. Such 
would mean a world population of about eight billion people by the 
year 2017, sixteen billion by 2058, and so forth to some inevitable 
stopping point. 
Even if the very recent decline from humanity's previous annual 
growth rate of over two percent continues, the planet's capacity to 
• Copyright ©,1978, William G. Hollingsworth, Associate Professor, University of Tulsa 
College of Law .-The author wishes to thank Professor Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law School 
for his kind suggestions, stimulating conversations, and constructive criticisms with respect 
to this article. However, the author accepts sole responsibility and blame for the contents of 
this article. 
1 Dubos, Second Edition: Does Man Have a Future, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, (No.2, 1971), 
at 58. 
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feed adequately, to shelter, to enable even minimal care for the 
health of, and to provide any physical amenities for, an inevitable 
increased billions of persons is subject to serious doubt. And even if 
th.e technological optimists are right in believing that science can 
provide a nutritionally sound diet for a population of several billion 
more people, the equally grave question must be asked: What will 
providing for eight, ten, twelve or more billion human beings on a 
continuing basis do to the still little understood chemical-climatic-
microorganismic base that enables complex plant and animal life to 
exist on this planet at all? 
Even if the environmental-ecological optimists are right in wish-
fully assuming that more and more billions of people can co-exist 
with the planet and with each other harmoniously-and the moral 
superoptimists are right in believing that we human beings shall be 
self-restrained enough to do SO-,2 other questions must also be 
asked: What would life on and/or "above" the planet be like with 
two, three, or four times the present human population? What 
would be the chances for anything resembling personal freedom?3 
What value would society likely accord to an individual human 
being? How "socially wanted" would each person be apt to feel? 
What would be the success probability of humankind's efforts, even 
2 Minimal pollution? And no private motor vehicles? And none but absolutely essential 
energy use? 
" The answers of Rene Dubos to the above questions are not cheerful: 
Behavioral changes are also likely to result from population increase. The complexity of 
social structures will make some form ofregimentation unavoidable; freedom and privacy 
may come to constitute antisocial luxuries and the type of human beings more likely to 
prosper will be those willing to accept a regimented and sheltered way of life in a teeming 
and polluted world from which all wilderness and fantasy will have disappeared. The 
domesticated farm animals and the laboratory rodent on a controlled nutritional regimen 
in a controlled environment will then become true models for the study of man. 
Through technological developments, the earth could probably be capable of feeding, 
clothing, and battery-keeping many billions of persons. But then nobody would be able 
to move without impediment and irritating interference. Eventually, half the population 
would have to be doctors, nurses, or psychiatrists tending to the physical ailments and 
neuroses of the other half. To this future population, the bomb may no longer be a threat 
but a temptation: it may appear as the salvation from all evil. 
In other words, technological factors such as supplies of food, power, or natural resources 
and other factors involved in the operation of the body machine and of the industrial 
establishment are not the only ones to be considered in determining the optimum number 
of people that can live on earth. Just as important for maintaining human life is an 
environment is which it is possible to satisfy the longing for quiet, privacy, independence, 
initiative, and some open space. These are not frills or luxuries but real biological necessi-
ties. They will be in short supply long before there is a critical shortage of the materials 
and forces that keep the human machine going and industry expanding. 
Dubos, supra note 1, at 58-59 (emphasis in original). 
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if far more earnest than our present efforts, to allow every member 
of the human race a decent chance for well being and self-
fulfillment? 
Both from the perspective of wishing to maximize humanity's and 
other living creatures' long-term survival chances and from the 
perspective of wishing to maximize quality of life prospects for 
the whole human family, humankind should decide that a human 
fertility rate in every nation no greater than that needed for that 
nation's population replacement-long-term "zero population 
growth"-is a goal demanding attainment as soon as is humanely 
possible.4 
Although the transnational nature and scope of humanity's need 
to control responsibly its numerical future will surely require world 
community consensus and international strategies, the political 
reality of nation-states requires attention to population manage-
ment qua intranational policy. It is to this latter requirement that 
this article speaks, with specific focus on the United States. 
Considering the extreme urgency of the population crisis in the 
developing world and also considering that the U.S. fertility rate 
has, since 1972, been appearing to be below our (U.S.) population 
replacement rate (exclusive of the effect of continuing immigration) 
of about 2.11 children per woman per lifetime,5 the reader may 
question any need to bother with further thinking about limiting 
population growth in the United States itself. Actually there are 
several reasons for insisting that at least as a matter of contingency 
planning we need to devote considerably more thought to formulat-
ing this nation's strategies for responsibly limiting its population. 
First, we have no assurance whatsoever that the United States' 
recent at-, near-, or just-below-replacement fertility rate is any-
thing other than a temporary dip from our usual situation of a 
, The fertility rate (children per woman's lifetime) needed for long-term population stabil-
ity (exclusive of immigration and emigration) depends upon the ratio of girl births to boy 
births and upon how many babies die before reaching the childbearing years. Because of the 
latter factor, the rate required can vary significantly from nation to nation. The U.S. replace-
ment rate is about 2.11. 
5 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, No. 632, ESTIMATES 
OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE: 1930 TO 1975, at 2-4 
(1976). Estimates of U.S. fertility are continually updated and published by the Bureau. 
Interpretations of the data vary, however. Speaking with respect to our reported fall to 
replacement in 1972, demographer Norman Ryder cautioned that, in view of our increasing 
tendency to defer babymaking, "[a] more realistic evaluation is that the cohorts now in the 
mainstream of childbearing will end up with a total [number of offspring] which may exceed 
replacement by 10 percent or even more." Ryder, Two Cheers for ZPG, DAEDALUS CII, Fall, 
1973, at 47. 
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population-expanding fertility. Interestingly, with respect to most 
of the world's industrial and supposedly antinatalist nations, the 
birth dearth worriers have thus far been proven wrong. This is not 
to claim that they will inevitably be proven wrong again. It is rather 
to claim that for us to assume that American couples will never 
again want and have more children than are commensurate with our 
long-term ZPG-and thus to avoid thinking about what policies we 
ought adopt if the assumption proves wrong-is foolish social un-
preparedness. 
Second, the still continuing population growth effect (namely, 
more couples of childbearing age) resulting from our baby boom 
lasting from the late 1940's into the 1960's-plus expected net immi-
gration-allows the U.S. scant leeway for fertility rates in excess of 
the replacement rate. Due to that baby boom, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, due to expected immigration, even a 2.11 children per woman 
replacement fertility rate would give us a U.S. population of nearly 
315 million in 2040. Were we merely to resume our 1970 fertility rate 
of 2.43 children per woman for ten years and then gradually level 
off to replacement, there would be something like 340 million Amer-
icans in 2040.6 A return to fertility rates comparable to those of the 
1960's would produce a dramatically higher population than that. 
If, henceforth, American couples were once again to have an average 
of three children in a lifetime, there would be nearly one billion 
Americans in one hundred years.7 
Third, because of the disproportionately high energy, material 
resource, and food consumption demands each American makes 
upon this finite planet's resources and pollution-coping capacity, 
U.S. population growth has particularly serious environmental con-
sequences. Even if, as must soon happen, our per capita consump-
tion is reduced, the aggregate benefits to the rest of the world from 
our consumer restraint will be wholly or partially cancelled out by 
our own population increases.8 Looking at the same general point in 
• Both estimates derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 
No. 480, ILLUSTRATIVE POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR THE UNIED STATES: THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO ZERO GROWTH (1972). 
7 COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, POPULATION AND THE AMERICAN 
FUTURE 22 (1972). 
H One might ask, albeit somewhat ingenuously, why not reduce U.S. per capita consump-
tion enough to correct in toto our unequal share of the world's admittedly finite bounty? The 
obvious answer is that there are political limits to the degree of economic restraint one can 
reasonably expect from a society as addicted to affluence as is ours, and that there are 
emotional limits as to how quickly one can reasonably expect a substantial withdrawal from 
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a somewhat different way, virtually every American claims the right 
to consume goods at a level well above that of most of the world. 
For every additional American there is apt to be less of the United 
States' (of not unlimited potential) total wealth effectively avail-
able for sorely needed efforts to salvage the global environment and 
to assist the genuinely destitute members of the human population 
throughout the world in gaining a tolerable life for themselves. 
Looked at in either of the foregoing ways, the cost of permitting 
above-replacement U.S. fertility is extremely high. 
Fourth and last, above-replacement U.S. fertility would set an 
unacceptably lax example to the rest of the world. For most of the 
"Third World" nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the 
attainment of no-greater-than-replacement fertility as soon as is 
humanely possible is an essential ingredient for their peoples' hav-
ing any chance for a minimally humane existence in the foreseeable 
future. 9 Even so, we cannot necessarily expect those nations to 
accept from the United States the nontoken financial and technical 
family planning assistance sorely needed for them to achieve long-
term ZPG unless we ourselves are unequivocally committed to the 
same goal within our own borders. The history of colonial exploita-
tion makes any help from the West suspect. Suspicions may be 
particularly aroused by famly planning assistance, in view of the 
emotional and political hypersensitivity of population meddling. 
Moreover, there is something fundamentally untenable about not-
underpopulated nation X generously helping nation Y limit nation 
Y's population while nation X continues to reproduce at a 
population-expanding rate. 
The concerns expressed in reasons three and four above warrant 
our going a step further and aiming for a U.S. fertility rate no 
greater than that necessary for population replacement adjusted for 
the perpetual growth effect of continuing net immigration. With our 
presently expected annual net immigration of 400,000 (exclusive of 
extensive illegal immigration, which we can and ought to reduce to 
a very small figure), we would thus be seeking a fertility rate in this 
that addiction. The question thus has no practical relevance for the short run and only limited 
relevance for the intermediate run. And, with respect to solving the global environmental-
ecological crunch, waiting for the long run is apt to be too late. See generally D. MEADOWS, 
THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, A REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF 
MANKIND (1972). Limiting its own population growth must thus be one part of the United 
States' effort to be a world-caring member of the community of nations. 
• Even were they to attain that goal in less than a decade, their populations would be 
soaring far into the 21st century, absent mass famine or some other catastrophe. 
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country of about 1.98.10 Even this rate of reproduction would give 
the nation a population increase of about 80 million persons before 
we reached actual ZPG at about 296 million Americans around 
2040 or SO.11 Thanks to those women who will bear no children or 
have only one child in their lifetime, a 1.98 fertility rate does not 
preclude any woman who wants two children from having them. 
Nor, for the same reason, is it incompatible with nature's full dose 
of multiple births and with some couples' planning for more than 
two children. 12 
Since our reception of emigrants from other nations frequently 
carries at least some humanitarian connotation (though along with 
considerable benefits to this country!) one may object to any 
claimed moral or political imperative to reduce our own reproduc-
'0 See Coale, Alternative Paths to a Stationary Population, in COMM'N ON POPULATION 
GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, RESEARCH REpORTS VOL. I, DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL 
ASPECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH (1972) at 598. Coale's fertility figure for long-term ZPG with 
400,000 annual net immigration is 1.97, but it assumes a perpetual 2.11 fertility rate in the 
foreign born population. My figure of 1.98, approximating long-term ZPG fertility for both 
domestic and foreign born American women considered together, is simply the average be-
tween the 1.97 and 2.11 figures, weighted according to the projected ultimately stabilized 
relative size of the aforementioned two groups of persons under the 400,000 annual immigra-
tion assumption. 
II About 58 million of the 80 million increase would be the completed demographic effect 
of the post World War II baby boom. The resulting stabilized U.S. population of approxi-
mately 296 million would exceed by a little over eight percent, or between 22 and 23 million 
persons, the stabilized U.S. population of about 274 million that would have resulted with 
zero net immigration (and replacement fertility) since 1970. See id. and Current PopuLation 
Report.~, .~upra note 6. Perhaps partly because a reduction in U.S. net immigration from its 
expected figure of 400,000 per year would (1) decrease the projected ultimately stabilized U.S. 
population to a figure somewhere between 274 million and 296 million persons ("just where 
between" of course depending on the size of the reduction), and (2) slightly decrease the 
amount of reproductive self-restraint needed for U.S. ZPG, some commentators have favored 
a reduction in U.S. immigration quotas. For example, a minority of the Commission on 
Population Growth and the American Future "felt that the number of immigrants should be 
gradually decreased, about 10 percent a year for five years. This group was concerned [in 
part) with the inconsistency of planning for population stabilization for our country and at 
the same time accepting large numbers of immigrants each year." POPULATION AND THE AMERI· 
CAN FUTURE, .~upra note 7, at 117. In arguing that U.S. fertility ought not exceed immigration-
adju.~ted replacement, I am admittedly not providing any help toward deciding, nor even 
taking a position on, the difficult policy question raised by the just quoted passage . 
• 2 Unsurprisingly so, in view of our reported "total fertility rate" (the sum of the year's 
fertility rates for each age of women of childbearing age) in 1975 of 1.800 (1,800 births per 
1,000 women). CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supra note 5, at 3. The Bureau of the Census 
cautions however: 
[T)he total fertility rate is an annual (or period) measure of fertility, even though it is 
expressed as a hypothetical lifetime (or cohort) measure .... [It) is affected by the 
timing as well as the level of fertility. . . . While it is possible that young women could 
complete their cohort fertility at this low level, recent survey data on birth expectations 
suggest that the actual figure may be somewhat higher. 
[d. at 2 n.l. 
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tion to offset an immigration-caused population gain, no matter 
how large that gain be. There is, however, the likely perspective of 
other nations viewing the U.S., which includes the widely shared 
perception that, within limits, a larger population does increase a 
nation's prestige and potential military strength. From that 
perspective, the moral and political imperative being here referred 
to must surely apply once the United States' projected population 
increase threatened to exceed the aforementioned 80 million gain 
that would occur with net annual immigration of 400,000 and 
immigration-adjusted replacement fertility. Were U.S. fertility in-
stead to average 2.11 replacement, and thus not adjust to the per-
petual growth effect of our 400,000 per year expected immigration, 
we would not only be producing a roughly 58 million population 
increase from understandably allowing our past baby boom to run 
its full demographic course;13 we would also be adding more than 15 
million people to the U.S. population by 2010, more than 41 mil-
lion by 2050, more than 60 million by 2080,14 with, under these 
assumptions, no end to substantial population increases in sight. By 
no plausible reckoning would this population outlook be consistent 
with the example of commitment to the soon as reasonably feasible 
achievement of ZPG that the U.S. ought, as one part of a minimum 
national example of earth-caring, be sharing with the rest of the 
world. 
With respect to more immediate U.S. self-interest, there is also 
good reason why immigration-adjusted replacement fertility should 
13 Though our present population of about 216 million is certainly adequate, for the U.S. 
to demand of itself immediate ZPG would be an extremely difficult and undesirable under-
taking. Due to the presence now of a considerably higher proportion of young persons than 
would exist under a stable population, there would, for some time, have to be sufficient 
inducement to persuade the American people to reproduce at an average rate as low as 55% 
below replacement, later followed by the need for subsequent cohorts to reproduce at an 
above-replacement fertility rate, followed by the need for more such cycles of gradually 
diminishing intensity. During these decades of somewhat dizzying fertility goal shifting, there 
would result, if the shifts were "successfully" effected, an extremely irregular pattern of age 
distribution. See Coale, supra note 10, at 595-96. A less disruptive goal would be for the U.S. 
to decide to seek a temporarily below 1.98 fertility rate sufficient to offset the 22 to 23 million 
increase in the stabilized population that would ultimately result from 400,000 annual net 
immigration and immigration-adjusted replacement fertility. (The below 1.98 rate would, of 
course, eventually have to be raised, else the population would eventually disappear.) Al-
though the latter scenario would require a much smaller degree of fertility goal shifting than 
the former, one must still wonder about the psychological and sociological consequences of 
officially or unofficially commending different fertility goals to different childbearing cohorts . 
.. Figures derived from CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supra note 6, at 9. The projected 
population gains assume that childbearing by women immigrants will also average the 2.11 
replacement rate. 
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be viewed as this nation's maximum acceptable fertility for the 
relevant future. I borrow the words of energy and environmental 
scholar John Holdren: 
But in no event is a population size that is at or near the maximum 
[possible] likely to be optimum: if availability of resources defines the 
limit, the maximum implies bare subsistence for all; if environmental 
constraints define it, the maximum is likely to represent a precariously 
unstable situation. 
. . . [T]he concept of the optimum population hinges on the need for 
social cultural and environmental diversity, for only thus can a wide 
variety of preferences be satisfied. At very low population sizes, the raw 
material for sufficient cultural and social diversity does not exist; near 
the physical maximum, on the other hand, diversity must be sacrificed 
in order to maximize efficiency. From the individual's perspective, of 
course, diversity in the social and physical environments is related to 
personal options-access to a variety of employment possibilities, living 
accommodations, educational and recreational opportunities, degrees of 
privacy, and so forth. With respect to this criterion, then, one can say 
that the optimum population size is that beyond which further growth 
closes more options than it opens. The reader may wish to ponder what 
this definition implies in the case of the United States. For myself, I am 
unable to think of many options being opened by further population 
growth (greater variety in airline schedules?), but I can think of a good 
many that are being closed (the opportunity to escape congestion, to 
survive without an automobile, to live anywhere but in a city). 
My own suspicion is that the United States, with about 210 million 
people, has considerably exceeded the optimum population size under 
existing conditions. It seems clear to me that we have already paid a 
high price in diversity to achieve our present size ... ,IS 
Whether or not Holdren's observations make a compelling case for 
the nation's committing itself to the goal of negative population 
growth, when added to the considerations already enumerated, they 
necessitate the conclusion that an undelayed national commitment 
to an at least as population-growth-limiting "fertility ceiling" as I 
am advocating is essential if we wish to maximize our own well 
being and if we wish effectively and nontrivially to help maximize 
the well being of all humankind. 
" Holdren, Population and the American Predicament: The Case Against Complacency, 
DAEDALUS CII, Fall, 1973, at 40·41. 
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II. THE CHOICE OF REMEDIES-A BRIEF LOOK 
Assuming arguendo that a political consensus in favor of limiting 
U.S. fertility to immigration-adjusted replacement or to some other 
specified norm is sooner or later reached, then comes the question 
of how to try and actualize the limits agreed upon. The problem is 
not a simple one. The nation's actual fertility rate is an average 
resulting from a myriad of private decisions and nondecisions. Even 
as to the present, or more accurately, as to the recent past, the rate 
is estimated rather than known. As to the future, it is inherently 
unknowable and, absent the inauguration of an unprecedented de-
gree of social control, cannot be predicted with any amount of con-
fidence. 
Despite the above difficulties, and because of the considerable 
success of the ZPG movement in this country even without the 
endorsement of our elected political leaders, one may be tempted 
to rely upon an intensification of the moral suasion approach should 
U.S. fertility appear to be exceeding any explicitly or implicitly 
adopted national goal. This volunteer approach, however, ought not 
to be the whole of our contingency thinking for two reasons. The first 
reason is rather obvious: despite its past relative success, the moral 
suasion approach (along with existing economic disincentives to 
planning a large family) could easily prove insufficient to prevent 
or correct a resurgence of population-expanding fertility. 
The second reason is less obvious. Assuming, as seems extremely 
likely, that the global (and domestic?) population and resources 
outlook will continue morally to require that people, Americans and 
others, create fewer babies than at least some couples very much 
want to create, even if it succeeds in the aggregate in holding down 
U.S. reproduction the moral suasion approach will do a very poor 
job in the realm of social justice: within the nation it will do a very 
poor job of allocating the personal sacrifice involved in persons' 
having fewer children than they often deeply want and would other-
wise create were they not faced with the moral imperative to help 
limit human population growth. The moral suasion approach does 
such a poor job because individuals differ greatly in their sensitivity 
to, and in their willingness to sacrifice their own wants to, social-
moral demands. Some refuse to sacrifice at all. Some 
"undersacrifice." Some "oversacrifice." 
Accordingly, the greater a society's need to use moral suasion to 
limit fertility, the more likely it is that persons most mindful of 
social needs will bear a disproportionate share of the mental pain 
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involved in having a fewer than wanted number of children. IS Grant-
ing that a volunteer approach to any social duty has the same essen-
tial defect and granting that in some sense virtue is always its own 
reward, it still seems that in a matter as important to the individual 
as having children we ought attempt to allocate the burden of social 
imperatives in a way less exploitive of the socially dutiful. At least 
this is true if the need for, or the use of, moral suasion to limit 
fertility is intensified beyond what already exists. 
At the opposite, at all thinkable extreme from ZPG via moral 
appeal would be the imposition of some sort of per person or, more 
feasibly, per woman reproduction quota to be enforced with some 
sort of legal sanction (compulsory sterilization? imprisonment?) 
against the noncomplying adult. Absent some starkly obvious and 
critical emergency, so Draconian an approach to U.S. ZPG would 
have near zero chance of public acceptance or even reluctant 
nonresistance. 
Even apart from its unfeasibility and somewhat ghoulish over-
tones, absent an immediate exigency that would require that every-
one be prevented from planning more than two children,17 there is 
reason not to fall in love with the personal quota approach. This 
approach fails to take cognizance of differences in individual wants 
and needs and differences in intensity with respect to wants and 
needs common to all or most persons. If the Smiths would much 
prefer to forgo automobiles, expensive vacations, power lawnmow-
ers, and air conditioners, in order to have four children, then the 
Smiths would arguably cause no more environmental problems than 
the Joneses who would rather have zero children in order to maxim-
ize their store-bought pleasures. In such cases, the per person quota 
approach does an extremely poor job of maximizing, within feasible 
aggregate limits, each couple's access to their own brand of happi-
ness. 
Dissatisfaction with both the coercive quota and the volunteer 
approaches to attaining and sustaining population nongrowth leads 
" The above phenomenon surely includes persons who, largely because of their moral 
convictions with respect to the global population crisis, deny themselves the joy and personal 
fulfillment of creating any children at all. In believing that in recent years felt moral duty 
has been an important cause in more young people's opting for nonparenthood, I admittedly 
rely on "soft" and anecdotal evidence. Nevertheless, I am convinced that a cynical denial of 
the nonrare occurrence of this cause is as unrealistic as the also fictional suggestion that "ZPG 
duty" is invariably the main reason anyone chooses to have no or few children. 
t7 Such a situation arguably does now exist in several population-exploding, subsistence-
lacking nations. 
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to a third alternative, namely, the use of a market mechanism to 
avoid a population-increasing level of fertility.ls But this market or 
incentive system should be as neutral with respect to income and 
wealth as is reasonably possible. It ought attempt not to bring about 
or to maintain stronger fertility self-restraint amongst persons in 
anyone income or wealth group than it helps accomplish or sustain 
amongst persons in any other. If the system generally succeeds in 
that respect, it will likely succeed in apportioning fertility-limiting 
deprivations (i.e., the having of few or no children) amongst the 
citizenry in such a way that those who, relative to their wants for 
other costly goods, least want any or many children will be the ones 
who have no or few children-a considerable improvement over both 
the moral suasion and the per person quota approaches in minimiz-
ing human unhappiness. 
Because of the unpredictability and changeability of fertility 
rates, it would be virtually essential to be able to increase and 
decrease prospectively the degree of economic fertility disincentive 
and to be able to do so with reasonable swiftness and ease. Without 
this flexibility the system would have little chance of encouraging 
the approximate level of fertility desired for the nation as a whole. 
Although the environmental literature has made frequent men-
tion of the possibility and the arguable desirability of using an eco-
nomic incentive approach either to reduce or to stabilize a nation's 
fertility, there has apparently been little inclination amongst writ-
ers to think through and to set forth in any detail what they have 
in mind. This article describes a concrete plan, including a specific 
example of a possible incentive structure, in the hope of encouraging 
others to improve upon this version and/or to offer one or more 
alternatives.19 
" There already is considerable economic disincentive to having children in a highly indus-
trialized society. In other words, the status quo employs the volunteer approach only to a 
partial extent. On the other hand, the proposed use, or, more accurately, the contingently 
proposed increased use of economic incentives to encourage fertility self-restraint ought not 
imply that economic considerations are the only or even the chief factor in couples' decisions 
to have or not to have a child. Nor ought the proposal imply that there are no other social 
incentives the enhancement of which would help discourage a baby boom resurgence, as well 
as offering other significant benefits. Women's equality and, for all ages and both sexes, the 
emergence of adequate structures of interpersonal relationships outside the mode of having 
lots of children and grandchildren are prime examples. With respect to the latter example, 
we had best look primarily to private, nongovernmental endeavors. 
" Though written with the U.S. in mind, much of what follows could likely be adapted to 
other highly industrialized societies as well. Whether anything like the incentive structure to 
be presented here would have any plausible chance of soon enough working, or even if (sur-
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m. A "CONTINGENCY PLAN" FOR THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Basic Proposal 
With all the foregoing considerations in mind, the proposal is as 
follows: If and when U.S. fertility should appear to be exceeding our 
replacement fertility rate adjusted for our expected average annual 
net immigration, let parents with above-average incomes pay an 
annual premium or tax according to how many children they pro-
duce and let persons with below-average incomes be paid an annual 
subsidy according to how few children they produce. The subsidy 
would, of course, be over and above any public assistance to which 
a household was entitled. 
If, as is quite possible, our fertility appears to be exceeding the 
immigration-adjusted replacement norm when the reader reads this 
article, the proposal obviously loses its "contingency plan" status 
and becomes a call for as soon as possible enactment. 
Even if the nation's then current fertility and expected immigra-
tion estimates suggest that we are apparently not exceeding the 
immigration-adjusted replacement norm, congressional enactment 
of the plan on a standby basis would be highly desireable. The 
prerogative of a future Congress to back off from a previously 
adopted policy notwithstanding, explicit commitment both to 
immigration-adjusted replacement as a self-imposed fertility limit 
and to the adoption of formal economic fertility disincentives if and 
when needed in order to stay within that limit would (a) offer evi-
dence to the rest of the world of our own serious commitment to a 
responsible population policy, (b) insure against the needless and 
(in greater population growth) costly delay of having to engage in 
an extensive national debate over what, if any, action to take after 
our fertility was at some future time estimated as being significantly 
above our implicitly or explicitly adopted limit, (c) likely result in 
our developing and adopting a more carefully thought out fertility 
disincentive plan due to the advantage of pre-crisis, rather than 
during-crisis, public discussion, and (d) perhaps itself even reduce 
some of the pressure facing the young adult who wants biological 
and psychological parenthood but feels the moral weight of the pop-
ulation question (since an explicit national commitment to respon-
sible limits would tend to free him or her from feeling the need to 
prisingly) so, ought be utilized in a below-, at-, or not-much-above-subsistence economy with 
a rapidly growing population is left to the judgment of others. 
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assume a disproportionate share of the sacrifice). 
With respect to the matter of when actually to impose formal 
economic incentives for fertility self-restraint, the following ques-
tion must be faced: If U.S. fertility should fall below immigration-
adjusted replacement to any significant degree and thereafter rise 
above that norm, should the later above-replacement fertility be 
deemed acceptable (and thus not grounds for imposing incentives) 
as long as it didn't more than offset the prior "fertility deficit"? In 
other words, what ought to be the time parameters when we ask 
whether our fertility is apparently exceeding the prescribed norm? 
This question also encompasses a possible "population deficit" 
caused by an increase, cataclysmic or otherwise, in mortality, as 
well as a drop in births or net immigration. My admittedly tentative 
answer has two parts. First, it is neither necessary nor realistic to 
regard our merely compensating for a "past" (if one happens!) oc-
currence of below-immigration-adjusted replacement fertility or 
analogous "deficit" with a later occurrence of above-the-norm fertil-
ity as a divergence from a publicly voiced U.S. commitment to 
immigration-adjusted replacement as our "henceforth upper fertil-
ity limit." Second, however, in view of the global ecological threat 
and outlook of resource scarcity, as long as the nation's actual and 
projected numbers of people appeared reasonably adequate, it 
would be highly desirable to institute fertility disincentives upon 
the apparent occurrence of even an above-the-norm fertility that 
was merely "making up" for a past "deficit," and thus even in that 
situation attempt to encourage a prompt return to immigration-
adjusted replacement. 2o 
20 What are the lower limits of "reasonably adequate"? Opinions will certainly differ, but 
an eventual fairly stable U.S. population of 180 million, our total population in 1960, ought 
hardly be regarded as national extinction. Concerning a collateral "birth dearth" worry, 
namely, an onslaught of superproblems due to a low-fertility-caused unsatisfactory (albeit 
temporary) age distribution situation, which in this case is a polite way of voicing the fear of 
there being too high a percentage of old people: There is no plausibly expectable drop in U.S. 
reproduction that could cause society anything near the difficulties caused by the post World 
War II baby boom. Clearly, though, the task of meeting a society's needs and wants is made 
much less difficult by keeping fertility at a fairly stable rate (which, with a not unsatisfactory 
number of people, in the long run obviously should approximate replacement). By allowing 
the rate to fluctuate widely, we bring about a cyclical existence of needing more schools, less 
schools, more jobs, less jobs, more pensions and health care for the elderly, less pensions and 
health care for the elderly, etc., etc. 
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B. The Fertility Tax and the Fertility Restraint Subsidy-A First 
Look 
As already suggested, the actual employment of the contingency 
plan if and when it seemed needed would involve levying a "fertility 
tax" on relatively high-income parents and granting a "fertility re-
straint subsidy" to persons with relatively lower incomes. Unsur-
prisingly, a number of "secondary" policy-legal decisions are re-
quired to give shape to that plan. 
For computing the amount of either (a) a particular taxpayer's 
liability for the fertility tax ("FT") in any given year or (b) a partic-
ular recipient's entitlement to the fertility restraint subsidy 
("FRS") in any given year, 21 "fertility" should be legally defined 
with reference to the relevant woman (or women) as the number of 
then living children, conceived on or after the FT-FRS system's 
beginning or "contingency notice" date, which she (they) had 
borne.22 Since only the woman's "childmaking count" is a relatively 
publicly ascertainable fact, both administrative feasibility and pro-
tection of personal-sexual privacy require that the primary focus of 
the FT-FRS system be the female gender. Accordingly, it would 
make compelling sense for the subsidy to be payable to women only. 
However, liability for the fertility tax could, and to enhance collecti-
bility should, fall as later described on both the mother and the 
father if the latter's identity is known. One man could thus be liable 
for fertility taxes involving two or more women. If the father's ident-
ity were not known, the mother with an above average income would 
herself pay a fertility tax. 23 
As suggested in the proposed legal definition of "fertility" for FT 
liability and FRS entitlement, I do not favor taxing parents for 
children born or conceived prior to the tax inception date, or at least 
21 All governmental programs must ultimately be reduced to either catchy or meaningless 
initials. 
" Where there is a bona fide factual doubt as to whether conception preceded the relevant 
date, the question could and should be resolved in favor of the individual taxpayer or subsidy 
recipient. For a discussion of the term "contingency notice," see note 24, infra. 
23 The Equal Rights Amendment, if enacted, should not preclude the above sexual distinc-
tions, since they reasonably relate to a physical characteristic, childbearing, unique to one 
sex. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893-96 (1971). 
The provisions stated in the text could and should be applied to the case of artificial 
insemination by a donor whose identity is to be kept confidential. If, as is usual, the mother's 
husband is to be regarded as the actual father, he would be liable for the FT, if for no other 
reason than to protect full confidentiality. 
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its date of widespread public "contingency notice."24 As with any 
"grandfather clause" effect, there is arguably unwarranted favorit-
ism toward those who were spared the newly imposed burden by the 
fortuity of time. The only real and sufficient defense of this favorit-
ism is that retroactively applying the fertility tax would be a sub-
stantially greater injustice against present large families, who never 
contemplated paying such a tax, than would their escape from the 
tax be an unjust windfall. 
Use of the same prospective approach in granting women with 
below-average incomes the FRS would initially require granting an 
annual subsidy computed as if there were no children to all eligible 
women no matter how many children each had already actually 
borne. Only as a woman had additional children would her subsidy 
for fertility self-restraint ever be reduced. Unfortunately, the com-
bined effect of not taxing higher-income parents for their previously 
conceived children and monetarily rewarding all women with lower 
incomes for fertility self-restraint, regardless of the number of chil-
dren they had previously borne, would make for a prohibitively 
expensive program at the start and for years thereafter. 
Because of the foregoing problem a special form of prospectivity 
is recommended for the FRS: Children conceived prior to the sys-
" Using an earlier date than that of the tax' actual inception may be desirable since the 
stand-by enactment or even serious public and congressional consideration of an FT-FRS 
system could encourage a temporary increase in pregnancies. Some couples might go ahead 
and have a child or children earlier than they otherwise would have planned in hopes of 
avoiding the likelihood of a fertility tax or an FRS reduction for that child. Although a frantic 
race toward conception should not be expected, it must be noted that an acceleration of a 
cohort's family planning timetable may serve to increase the total number of offspring pro-
duced. More importantly, even if the number of persons affected were small, there are poten-
tially nontrivial harms in encouraging people either to be parents sooner than they would 
otherwise have wanted or, worse, to make a hasty decision to assume that responsibility at 
all. 
Solely with respect to the foregoing considerations, one is tempted to favor counting a 
person's FT-and-FRS-affecting fertility from a date prior to any public discussion at all. 
However, there is also the consideration of fair notice. As an attempt to balance these conflict-
ing considerations, the date of "widespread public contingency notice" is proposed as a 
reasonably fair time from which to count anyone's fertility for purposes of computing an FT 
liability or an FRS entitlement. That date would be the day after the serious possibility of 
adopting an FT-FRS system - on a stand-by basis or otherwise - had been communicated 
through the mass media to the general public. Once the FT-FRS program had begun, the 
above difficulty could also occur with respect to word that a nontrivial increase in fertility 
tax rates (and/or FRS reduction rates) was appearing necessary, since those changes would 
also be applied prospectively. Hence use of the contingency notice concept would be war-
ranted there too. 
As ought also be the case with respect to the original inception of the program, notice of a 
possible tax rate of x percent ought not be deemed notice for an actual rate of x plus y percent. 
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tern's inception or, if used, the notice date, would not reduce any 
woman's subsidy entitlement. However, only those women, both 
married and single, who were then entering or who would later be 
entering the major child-bearing years would be, or would become, 
eligible to receive FRS benefit payments (meaning perhaps all 
women who would reach age twenty-one on or after the system's 
inception).25 
A related but distinct question is that of deciding an appropriate 
minimum age for subsidy entitlement. Eighteen would seem to be 
the likeliest choice.26 
How high a fertility tax and how generous a fertility restraint 
subsidy would we need? There is no way we can know even if and 
when we actually decide that U.S. fertility apparently needs lower-
ing by x amount. With or without an FT-FRS system, we can never 
know at what rate, based on the Census Bureau's and other experts' 
ongoing estimates, fertility will appear to be for any day after yester-
day. And, since fertility is ultimately a per lifetime figure, actual 
(as opposed to apparent or projected) fertility for persons currently 
of childbearing age is inherently unknowable on a current basis. Our 
devising specific tax and subsidy rates must always be an experi-
ment, and doubly so in the beginning when we would have no expe-
rience as to how couples' fertility decisionmaking responded to a 
given rate of fertility tax and/or a given rate of subsidy. Even after 
some experience, we still wouldn't really know. Social science not-
withstanding, people are in some sense free to behave differently in 
the future than they did in the past. 
Despite the foregoing agnosticisms, we ought decide on some 
structure of formal fertility disincentives for introduction if and 
when U.S. fertility should appear to be exceeding our immigration-
adjusted replacement rate. Else we have no real contingency plan. 
What follows is offered as a plausibly appropriate initial struc-
ture, with a tax and subsidy rate plausibly appropriate for the even-
tuality, which is arguably the likeliest one, of U.S. fertility appear-
ing to be but a small amount above the immigration-adjusted re-
25 Here there is a kind of reverse grandfather clause effect since the favoritism goes to the 
young. Its justification is also of a nonsublime nature: I can think of no other approach that 
would offer comparable reproduction-limiting prospects at a reasonable cost and without as 
much or greater structural unfairness. 
" One or more children conceived after the system's inception or notice date but during 
the mother's pre-age-eighteen years would, of course, reduce her fertility restraint subsidy 
when she did reach her eighteenth birthday. 
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placement norm. The wholly experimental status of this structure 
or of any other-even after actual use--':'must be underscored. After 
some or much trial and error, and assuming the requisite political 
flexibility, per child tax and subsidy reduction rates could differ 
widely from the suggested specifications in absolute amount, in 
inter- and intra-comparative value, in the incidence and the degree, 
if any, of progressivity and/or regressivity, and/or in any other con-
ceivable respect. Similarly, income dividing lines between FT pay-
ers, nonpayers, and FRS recipients could also turn out quite differ-
ently from what is suggested here. End of hedging; beginning of 
structure: 
A. The annual tax on reproduction by persons with above-
average income: 
1. When the identity of both parents was self-reported or oth-
erwise known with reasonable certainty by the government, 
and their combined income (or, if one parent was deceased or 
evading the FT and unreachable by legal process, the income 
of the remaining parent) in any given year after the program's 
inception exceeded the preceding year's average income for all 
U.S. families with at least two adults (both with and without 
children), the parents (or the remaining parent) would pay a 
tax for that year for each of their then living commonly pro-
duced children conceived after the program's inception, said 
per child tax to be equal to three percent of their after-income-
taxes income that year (likely including substantial cash and 
in-kind gifts and plus or minus child support payments to or 
from other households) in excess of the just described average 
U.S. income.27 The actual amount of tax for any given number 
of children would thus vary with the parents' or parent's above 
average income, if any, each year. Though it would be of little 
or no consequence as long as the parents were living together 
and pooling their income, technically the tax would be appor-
tioned between them according to the income of each. How-
ever, their joint property ought be attachable for tax owed by 
either party. 
Z7 In this and all other cases, U.S. income averages would be estimated net of federal and 
state income taxes. Although this article will not attempt to prescribe all the precise compo-
nents of "income" to be used in computing the applicable U.S. averages and each taxpayer's 
or subsidy recipient's annual income, obviously, as suggested in the accompanying text, there 
would likely be at least a few equity-required differences from Subtitle A of the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
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2. If the identity of one parent was unknown to the govern-
ment, the other natural parent, if she (or he?) had an above-
average annual income of her or his own, would pay fertility tax 
for each then living child conceived after the program's incep-
tion. The tax here would be equal to three percent of her or his 
after-tax income (likely including substantial cash and in-kind 
gifts and plus or minus child support payments to or from other 
households) in excess of the preceding year's average income 
for all U.S. households with only one adult (both with and 
wi thou t children). 28 
B. The annual subsidy for fertility self-restraint for women with 
a below-average income: 
1. Married women, and single women declaring themselves to 
be cohabiting with another adult, within the eligible age span 
(e.g., as suggested in the previous discussion), whose income 
combined with their husband's or partner's income was below 
the preceding year's average income of all U.S. households with 
at least two adults (both with and without children) in any 
given year after the program's inception would receive a pay-
ment as follows: 
2' Regarding situations A.l and A.2., whenever one or both parents of a given child were 
presently married to or living with another individual, reasonable and nationally uniform 
rules of thumb for apportioning real income between adult constituents of the then existing 
more-than-one-adult household or households would be needed. 
Although a comprehensive discussion is outside the scope of this article, in my totally 
unauthoritative opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court would and should uphold the tax as being 
a constitutionally permissible "excise tax" on reproduction. Though the tax would be col-
lected annually according to the number of living children and the family's income, it is 
essentially a tax on the production of babies. (The tax is levied on the parents only, not on 
the children themselves; it thus ought escape being labeled a not census-proportional "direct" 
or "capitation" tax, prohibited in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.) And, if needed, the sixteenth 
amendment should be ample warrant for varying the tax according to income. 
Admittedly, a hyperactivist and hyperreactionary future Supreme Court could hold that 
Due Process and/or emanations-formed penumbras prohibit a tax on human reproduction. 
Were the Court to do so in the face of spiralling U.S. and world population, it would be 
comically misapplying Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965), tragically dooming us to either (a) the usually difficult, time-consuming, and 
apt-to-fail process of constitutional amendment, (b) an unlikely attempt to enact a freedom-
impinging per person "fertility quota" (which, even if it overcame immense political opposi-
tion and functional impracticability, would probably also be struck down by the Court), or 
(c) the implausible conclusion that the United States Constitution was designed to shield 
survival-threatening and freedom-threatening population growth from humanely structured 
social control. It is, of course, the compelling public need referred to in (c) that, with other 
factors, starkly distinguishes the FT-FRS proposal from the logic of Roe and Griswold. 
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a) If she has borne no then living children conceived after 
the program's inception, a payment equal to twelve percent 
of the "deficit" in their combined after-tax annual income 
(likely including any substantial gifts, public assistance, 
etc.) compared with the U.S. average income described 
above. 
b) If there was one such child then living, a payment equal 
to nine percent of the above inco:ne deficit. 
c) If there were two such children then living, a payment 
equal to six percent of the above income deficit. 
d) If there were three such children then living, a payment 
equal to three percent of the above income deficit. 
e) If there were four or more such children then living, there 
would be no FRS payment. 
2. A single, legally separated, divorced, deserted, or widowed 
woman with a below-average income would receive a payment 
based on the deficit in her after-tax income (likely including 
any child support payments, substantial gifts, and public assis-
tance) in any given year compared with the preceding year's 
average income for all U.S. households with only one adult 
(both with and without children). The subsidy percentage rates 
for each number of "post-inception" children would be the 
same as those just described for married women.29 
" With reference to the IT-FRS structure as a whole, it would occasionally happen that a 
woman who had three or less children would have both an IT obligation and an FRS entitle-
ment in a given year. The reader is invited to design a no less fair and no more complicated 
system that avoids this admittedly bizarre result. 
Moreover, in designing the IT-FRS, one must face the inherently perplexing problems of 
(a) deciding what is fair treatment for households with one adult relative to the treatment 
accorded households with two or more adults, and (b) trying to actualize that decision in 
practice. Regarding the FT, no structural distinction is made based on the number of adults 
then present in the taxpayers' households. By not exacting a lighter IT from one-adult 
households, family splits or pseudo splits would not be encouraged. Also concerning the FT, 
the average income of two-adult households is to be used as the level of affluence above which 
the fertility tax would apply in situation A.I. (both parents known). However, the considera-
bly lower average income of one-adult households is to be used as the point where FT liability 
begins in situation A.2. (only one parent known to government), thus increasing the likelihood 
and amount of FT liability for persons in that category. This treatment is favored in order 
not to encourage the incidence of "anonymous" (and thus effectively "FT exempt") fathers. 
I do not believe it or any other aspect of the FT structure would weigh oppressively on then 
existing (not low-income!) one-adult households. 
Unlike the FT, which would normally be paid by both man and woman, the locus of the 
FRS is the woman per se. Such is logical since it is at least as possible for a woman to remain 
childless without a man as with one. To attempt reasonable income-assessing fairness in the 
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As with the fertility tax, the actual amount of a family's subsidy 
applicable to any given number of children would vary with the 
family's income from year to year, or, more exactly, would vary from 
year to year with the difference between the family's income and the 
appropriate U.S. average income of the previous year. A family with 
three or less children and a sufficiently changing income situation 
could receive an FRS in one year and pay fertility tax in another. 
C. Duration and Change-Issues and Recommendations 
An especially perplexing question: For how long should the par-
ents of any discrete group of children be subject to the fertility tax 
in years their household income is high enough, and for how long 
should any discrete group of women be entitled to the fertility re-
straint subsidy in years their household income is low enough? Until 
there is apparently no longer a population growth problem? Until 
U.S. fertility dropped too far and the FT-FRS system had to be 
shelved or perhaps even converted to a pronatalist structure? Or 
until the particular children for which someone is taxed or unsubsi-
dized reach age 21? Or until the children leave home? Though, as 
will be discussed later, tax and subsidy rates would likely be 
changed or ended prospectively on the basis of subsequent experi-
ence in operating the system, the proposed answer to the "How 
long?" question is as follows: Once a man and a woman have a child 
or children who, depending on whether or not the parents had a high 
enough income, either did make the parents liable or would have 
made them liable for a prescribed rate of tax,30 those parents, or 
either survivor, would be liable for that tax rate with respect to that 
FRS, women would be distinguished according to the two categories ("married, etc." and 
"single, etc.") described in B.l. and B.2. Since women filing for an FRS in the "single, etc." 
category would, unlike "married, etc." women, only have to declare their own income, we 
would measure a "single, etc." category person's deficit from the (considerably lower than 
for two-adult households) average U.S. income for one-adult households in order not to 
encourage "single, etc." or pseudo "single, etc." category filing. 
If it is believed that the just stated approach would inadequately pay low-fertility women 
in one-adult households, a somewhat higher FRS percentage rate could be used for women 
in the "single, etc." category to compensate somewhat for the use of the nation's average 
income for one-adult households in computing their "income deficit" to which their FRS 
entitlement rate would be applied. Also, a lower fertility tax rate could be set for FT taxpayers 
in then existing one-adult household situations. However, if special one-adult rates are used 
for either the FT or the FRS or for both, they ought not vary from the rates applicable to 
two-adult households to an extent apt to encourage feigned or real splits in the family unit. 
30 One possible prescribed rate of tax is the three percent per child formula described 
earlier. See text at note 27, supra. 
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child or children in all the parents' high-enough-income years for 
their entire lifetimes. However, the death of a child would terminate 
the parents' tax liability with respect to that child. Likewise, once 
a woman received, or would have received if her income had been 
small enough, a fertility restraint subsidy at a prescribed per child 
(or no children) rate, with respect to her fertility restraint that gave 
or would have given her the FRS, she would be entitled to that same 
subsidy rate for the rest of her life. The actual amount of her sub-
sidy, if any, in future years would, of course, be affected by any 
subsequent births and by the subsidy reduction rate or rates applic-
able to the later births. Her subsidy would also be affected by her 
income and her total number of subsidy-reducing children living at 
any later time. In summary then, both fertility tax liability and FRS 
rights would "vest" for life. 
This policy is desirable and reasonably just for two reasons. First, 
the benefits of having each child generally accrue to the parent for 
at least as long as parent and child are both living. More than a few 
parents have confessed to enjoying their children more after they 
had grown up than before. Even at long distances, the existence of 
grown children, and thus often young grandchildren and/or great-
grandchildren, is a significant psychological comfort, and some-
times a material comfort, in the later years of one's life. In a world 
facing its population support finitude, it seems quite proper (still 
speaking prospectively, of course) that even elderly persons who 
provided themselves with x number of children should incur a mod-
est cost by paying a tax or by receiving no or less fertility restraint 
subsidy for that often highly coveted benefit. Stated the other way, 
elderly persons-to the extent they have refrained from acquiring 
said benefit-should receive modest compensation by receiving a 
subsidy or by having to pay less or no tax. 
The second reason for stretching out the tax liability and subsidy 
eligibility for the parent's or parents' entire lifetime is that doing so 
would place more of the system's actual economic impact on the 
parents themselves and less of it on their growing children. By pro-
viding from the start that a parent would be paying a set tax or 
subsidy reduction rate for each child as long as both are living, 
smaller annual rates could, despite our tendency to discount future 
burdens and benefits, more likely be used than if the parent(s) were 
required to pay only during the child's minority.3! In other words, 
31 Admittedly, at any future date Congress could legally abolish the tax (but probably 
could not default on "contractually promised" subsidy rights) for older persons whose lifetime 
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there would not need to be as much dent into the high-fertility 
parents' budget while the children were still dependent on that 
budget.32 
Distinguished from the question of the duration of any particular 
individual's fertility tax obligation or FRS entitlement is the ques-
tion of when, once we had adopted the FT-FRS program, would we 
ever abolish it. Apart from the program proving to be an unsatisfac-
tory or inadequate means of limiting the nation's fertility (possibili-
ties to be discussed later and which could warrant the program's 
abolition or its supplementation by some other course of action), the 
answer seems simple in concept if somewhat problematical in prac-
tice. The FT-FRS system should be retained indefinitely, unless 
and until the nation's fertility appeared, on the basis of expert esti-
mates, to have fallen to an unacceptably low level. How low is 
unacceptable is, of course, a question that would and should be 
decided through the democratic process.33 
If U.S. fertility estimates were nearing, but were still above, the 
lower limits of felt adequacy, it would make sense to go ahead and 
reduce the degree of FT-FRS fertility-limiting incentives, a course 
that might well achieve the desired fertility outcome and thus war-
rant continuing the system at the new lower tax and subsidy reduc-
tion rates. Akin to earlier argumentation, whether the program was 
abolished in toto or merely modified, all changes should be applied 
prospectively. Specifically, if the original understanding was that 
liability had been "vested" by previous legislation. However, this would likely not be as 
popular a move as one might think; since other persons who had acted in response to the 
lifetime structure of incentives could and would object with justifiable vigor. 
3% Even if the just discussed reason is rejected as grounds for lifetime "vesting," it is still a 
strong argument for continuing parents' IT liability and FRS rights at least through the usual 
economically productive years (say, to age 65). 
33 The decision should, and likely would, take into account the problem of temporary 
distortion of the nation's age distribution, a by-product of fertility well above or well below 
the replacement level - as well as the taking into account of the aggregate population 
outlook. 
It is a fair question to ask, Why not a contingency plan for using economic incentive to 
increase fertility should that need ever arise? Though they are generally not labeled as 
economic incentives to increase fertility, in truth there are in this country numerous such 
measures, either existing or proposed. For example, per capita tax exemptions and credits, 
income maintenance payments that increase with family size, subsidized day care, subsidized 
school lunches, Medicaid, national health insurance, etc., are all programs that reduce, or 
would reduce, the cost of rearing children. What government and private programs have 
admittedly not done is to offer any parenthood subsidizing proposal for use only to the extent, 
and for the duration, that fertility requires encouraging. Separating fertility considerations 
from what society should do in behalf of children regardless of the fertility picture is admit-
tedly no easy moral and political task. 
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individuals would pay a tax on delineated income at a certain estab-
lished rate structure according to the number of children born to 
them during the time the program was in effect, then that tax rate 
structure on all covered adults for all children they produced during 
that time should continue for whatever duration originally speci-
fied, be it lifetime or some term of years. Similarly, if the original 
understanding was that individuals would be paid a subsidy with 
reference to delineated income at a certain established rate struc-
ture according to the number of children born to them during the 
period of the program, then that subsidy rate structure for all adults 
for their fertility restraint during that time should continue for 
whatever duration originally specified. The reason is both clear and 
compelling. For the program not to follow through on the "fertility 
deal" that was in effect would be blatantly unfair to everyone who 
had acted in response to that dea1.34 
D. Revenues, Expenditures, and the "Phasing-In Years" 
Given the already overwhelming excess of global needs over pub-
lic monies, it would be highly desirable that fertility tax revenues 
be sufficient, or nearly sufficient, to finance the granting of fertility 
restraint subsidies. Exclusive of administrative expenses, which 
would likely be minimized by having the IRS administer the FT-
FRS system along with the personal income tax, on a long-term 
basis the initial structure of the system is in concept roughly self-
supporting.35 
" The just stated concern does not mean that people covered by the original deal ought be 
taxed or have their already earned FRS reduced for children produced after the FT-FRS 
system has been prospectively abolished. Nor should such persons be denied a new lower 
fertility tax rate or FRS reduction rate on any subsequent children if such a rate becomes 
operative. In other words, the system's full honoring of its prior set of incentives need in no 
way prevent giving full and immediate prospective effect to a revised incentive structure. 
However, analogous to the approach to FRS prospectivity recommended for the program's 
inception, budgetary constraints would likely favor extending a higher FRS benefit structure 
only to women reaching age 21 on or after the date the new structure has been adopted. 
35 What would actually happen in practice can only be known after the fact, though edu-
cated guesstimates (beyond the scope of this article) would be helpful. 
One uncertainty, which could have a substantial impact upon the comparative amounts 
of aggregate FT revenues and aggregate FRS expenditures, is the question of what effect, if 
any, a particular FT-FRS incentive structure would have upon the timing of pregnancies. 
Although any such effect would likely not be enormous, it is plausible - especially with a 
high fertility tax and/or a sizable FRS benefit scale - that persons would be induced to defer 
their childbearing for several years so as to minimize their number of taxpaying years and 
thus minimize their total FT tax bill, and/or to maximize their number of FRS-getting years 
and thus maximize their total subsidy. To the extent that this happened, the task of keeping 
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In the short run, operating the FT-FRS system without generat-
ing a loss or a profit would be a virtual, if not a total, impossibility 
with the proposed initial FT-FRS structure, due to the extremely 
high likelihood that the adult population will continue to have a 
higher average income within some age groups than in others. More 
specifically, were the FT -FRS program as previously described 
adopted, we would have to expect substantial operating deficits in 
(roughly) the first two decades of its operation. This particular ex-
pectation is the result of three factors: First, if past experience is any 
guide, most adults in the normally most active childbearing years, 
say, under age 35, would have an income below the applicable U.S. 
average income covering adults of all ages.36 Second, with our adher-
ing to the policy of not taxing for children conceived prior to the 
program's enactment, adults below age thirty-five would have the 
overwhelming majority of children for which the parents could pos-
sibly be taxed during the FT -FRS's first two decades. And third, 
under the earlier outlined delineation of FT liability and FRS eligi-
bility according to income, most of this below-age-35 group of par-
ents would, in view of factor one, not be paying any fertility tax with 
respect to their children for a good number of years until the parents 
moved sufficiently up the income ladder (one possible blessing of 
middle-age at least) and, unless they had produced more than three 
children, would be receiving a fertility-restraint subsidy during the 
young adult years. All of this adds up to years of not insubstantial 
FT -FRS operating losses. 
If the FT-FRS program were continued with no substantial hike 
the IT-FRS system self-sufficient would become that much more difficult. There is also the 
question of whether any substantial "delayed parenthood effect" would have adverse conse-
quences with respect to the emotional well being of children, of parents, or of both - a 
question about which our opinions are almost certain to exceed our knowledge. (How old is 
the optimal age to have children? Even if we decide we think we know, how do we weigh any 
FT-FRS attributed causation of "older than ideal" parenthood against the gain of any re-
puted deterrence of "younger than ideal" parenthood?) If, for fiscal or other reasons, any 
delaying effect was seeming excessive, action could be taken to counter it: Fertility tax rates 
could be set slightly to moderately higher for the taxpaying lifetime of those starting parent-
hood or having additional children at older ages, but only higher enough likely to reduce suf-
ficiently the tax-saving appeal of waiting until later years. Similarly, FRS benefit reductions 
could be made smaller for women with respect to the children born in the not so mature 
portion of the childbearing years, thus mitigating the incentive to defer children one was 
planning to have anyhow. However, in both instances it should be remembered that, since 
having children earlier in life increases the total number of children a person is apt to have 
in a lifetime, an attempt to influence the timing of childbearing is liable also to affect fertility 
itself. 
" See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 388 (1974). 
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in the degree of fertility disincentives originally enacted,37 and as-
suming that parents' FT liability would continue at least well into 
the (relatively high-income) middle-age years, which under the ear-
lier outlined structure would be essential for fiscal nondisaster, for 
a number of years in about the third and fourth decades of the 
program's existence current FT revenues could be reasonably ex-
pected to exceed current FRS payments. Since the program would 
not yet be old enough to be paying FRS's to the over-65 age group 
(the latter virtually certain to be largely comprised of persons with 
a below-U.S.-average income at that time of their life), and since 
the program would be old enough to have a full or near-full span of 
members in their middle years, its intermediate phasing-in years 
likely would encounter more above-average income subject to the 
FT than the aggregate difference between below-average incomes 
and applicable U.S. average incomes upon which difference the FRS 
would be computed. 
Assuming that the previously recommended policy of lifetime FT 
liability and FRS entitlement (for those of sufficiently large/small 
income in any given year) was followed, we would expect that as the 
FT-FRS program in its fifth and sixth decades, if it lasted so long, 
included more and more elderly persons-most of whom likely 
would then be FRS recipients rather than FT payers-, the annual 
FT revenue surplus of the just prior decades would get progressively 
smaller and most likely would finally disappear or nearly disappear. 
Whether, once the FT-FRS system covered the entire adult age span 
of the population, the ensuing years would actually show a (proba-
bly not very great) cumulative FT revenue surplus or deficit is be-
yond the scope of current knowledge. Likewise, one cannot currently 
know whether or not the likely revenue surplus years would be suffi-
cient to offset the deficit years of the phasing-in decades of the 
system.38 Nevertheless, if the FT-FRS system was otherwise proving 
37 If FRS and FT rates were significantly increased, the same deficit/surplus expectancies 
for the increase's phasing-in decades as are discussed above with respect to the phasing in of 
the original program would apply, assuming that the earlier recommended approaches to IT 
and FRS prospectivity would be used in both cases. Since the original phasing in and the 
phasing in of one or several successive increases would all happen at different but likely 
overlapping times, the configuration could become other than simple. (The likely effect of 
phasing out or decreasing IT and FRS rates is suggested in note 38, infra. The quite possible 
problem of needing to raise or lower FRS rates relative to IT rates is discussed in the text at 
notes 53 et seq., infra.) 
3M If there was a cumulative deficit from the phasing-in years, it might be made up during 
the phasing-out years, if the program was ever abolished. The early phasing-out decades 
would likely involve a period of substantial revenue surpluses due to the fact that new cohorts 
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satisfactory, upon finally covering the entire adult age span the 
system would have reached a condition of relative stability com-
pared to the phasing-in years. Absent quite substantial changes in 
the nation's income, fertility, or mortality <:onfigurations, differ-
ences in income between age groups should henceforth not cause 
any substantial fiscal problem. 
As to the question of what ought be done about the expectation 
of nontrivial FT revenue deficits in the first two decades or so of the 
program, there are several options. First, the FT-FRS system could 
sell bonds in the expected deficit years, the bonds to mature in the 
following expected surplus years, with repayment guaranteed by the 
federal treasury. 
Second, the FT-FRS deficits could be directly financed by general 
federal revenues, with the later FT revenue surpluses becoming 
available for general governmental use. (If the system was expected 
to produce a substantial deficit or surplus in a given year, cogniz-
ance of same could, of course, be taken in planning the general 
federal budget so as to satisfy all Keynesian considerations no more 
imperfectly than we do now.) 
Third, the program's fiscal outlook could be improved during the 
early years, and, if need be, in the long run, by not paying FRS's to 
women until they have reached a slightly higher age than the eight-
een years earlier suggested. But this is a poor solution for the fairly 
obvious reason that starting the payments anytime later in life than 
at the beginning of the usual childbearing years could unduly 
weaken the program's desired fertility-limiting efficacy. (Arguably, 
with earlier pregnancies happening so frequently, the minimum 
FRS entitlement age should, if anything, be lowered.) 
Fourth, the fertility tax could be applied to persons whose annual 
income exceeds the applicable u.S. average for their age bracket in 
order to prevent the occurrence of any fiscal problem whatsoever 
from income disparities between age groups. For example, the ap-
plicable average income for one group could be that of "households 
with two or more adults where the major income getter or getters 
of young adults, most of whom would have been FRS recipients, would no longer be admitted 
into the program. In the final phasing-out decades, middle-aged members would be moving 
into the elderly years of life with no more young adults moving into the high-income middle 
years - thus ending the program with a good number of deficit years, hopefully to be 
financed, perhaps even with monies to spare, by the prior surplus years. 
Similarly, a reduction in IT -FRS fertility disincentives could also be expected to foster a 
series of surplus years followed by a series of deficit years. 
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are forty to forty-five years of age." Likewise, the FRS could be 
offered to otherwise eligible women of eighteen and over, still ex-
cluding those who reach age 21 prior to the program's inception, 
whose annual income falls below the applicable U.S. average for 
their age group. This approach would in any given year cause about 
the same aggregate amount of the country's personal income to be 
subject to the fertility tax as would constitute the computation base 
for the FRS. Though, even with comparable rates for the FT and 
the FRS, the actual amount of revenue collected and the actual 
total of subsidies paid each year would, of course, depend upon the 
fertility and income of each person involved, the probability of 
avoiding large fluctuations in the program's periodic revenue and 
expenditure equation would be immensely greater than that with 
the previously described initial structure which uses the applicable 
average income of all ages of adults as the criteria for deciding 
whether one is within the FT or FRS income range. Unfortunately, 
relative fiscal stability would be gained at the price of having to 
impose a fertility tax upon individuals whose income, though above 
average for his/her/their age group, was anything but above the 
applicable national average39 with respect to all ages of adults. Ob-
viously, this would happen only to people in the relatively low-
income adult age brackets, meaning a good number of young and 
elderly adults. How serious an evil? By one reckoning, since all 
fertili ty taxpayers would be in the top income half of their age group 
anyhow, their having to pay would seem to be neither an undue 
burden nor an injustice. By another, the prospect of a 22-year-old 
parent making $10,000 a year having to pay an FT while a 45-year-
old parent making $12,000 a year was getting an FRS subsidy would 
be intolerable.40 
Fifth, the following expedient would elude the foregoing arguable 
inequity and still likely avoid sizeable deficits in the starting de-
cades of the FT-FRS without use of the age bracket income averages 
approach: Instead of using U.S. average income(s) as the dividing 
line(s) between fertility taxpayers and FRS recipients, a moderately 
au "Applicable" refers to the one-adult household versus the household with two or more 
adults income distinction made with respect to categories A.I. and A.2., and B.l. and B.2., 
of the basic structure earlier outlined . 
•• The above approach could also provide an unwanted amount of encouragement for young 
couples to defer their childbearing until they entered an age group having a more affluent 
average income and, thus, a more favorable FT-FRS income dividing line. The possible 
delayed parenthood problem and its possible solution are described in note 35, supra. 
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lower dividing line, such as four-fifths of the applicable U.S. average 
for all ages of adults could be used initially. In ensuing (or nearly 
ensuing) years, with a sufficient number of middle-aged parents 
paying FT's, the FT-FRS dividing line could be gradually raised to 
U.S. average income, perhaps even putting the intermediate 
phasing-in years' surpluses to good earth-caring use rather than 
temporarily raising the dividing line to an above-average income 
levelY Although the FT would be assessed free from age discrimina-
tion, for some years a fertility tax liability would be imposed upon 
adults of all ages with below-average incomes. However, it being the 
case (a) that average incomes in this country embody an immense 
affluence compared with most of the rest of the world, (b) that no 
one with an income much below the applicable U.S. average would 
have to pay any FT at all, and (c) that actual FT amounts payable 
by taxpayers with below-average incomes would not be enormous, 
the just mentioned approach (and, for essentially similar reasons, 
the prior one) should not be considered out of the question. 42 
Needing but little imagination to suspect that options four and 
five would be the hardest to sell, and not wishing to make an unat-
tractive proposal even more unattractive, I shall, in this article, . 
continue to envision all-adult-ages average income as the most 
likely dividing line between FT payers and FRS recipients. 
IV. THE FT AND FRS-A BALANCED BUT NONNEUTRAL EVALUATION 
A. A Fairly Favorable Look 
The primary attraction of a formal economic incentive approach 
for lowering and/or holding down fertility is obvious. Along with 
noneconomic fertility disincentives, such as hopefully nonexcessive 
moral-social suasion in behalf of ZPG, and the considerable auto-
matic economic disincentive to fertility that already exists for most 
families in our and other industrial (and increasingly "nonsexist") 
societies, a formal system of economic disincentive, if ever needed 
at all, may be sufficient to prevent population-expanding fertility 
for the nation at large without destroying each couple's freedom to 
choose how many children they wish to have . 
.. Similarly, if the approach involving income averages based on age brackets were instead 
chosen, it could be gradually converted to the use of average income for all adults as the 
number of middle-aged fertility taxpayers increased . 
., It would, of course, also be possible to combine two or more of the options described 
above, using each chosen option to a milder extent than would be required were it used alone. 
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For all practical purposes, persons who want children and persons 
who want an above-average number of children would be as free to 
accomplish their wants as they are under the status quo. Admit-
tedly, however, they would be paying a modestly higher price for 
doing so than is presently the case. And, under the suggested FRS 
and FT structure, the price increase is designed to be as affordable 
by the poor as by the rich. Persons with relatively low incomes 
entering the likely childbearing years on or after the program's in-
ception would "pay extra" for each child conceived after the pro-
gram's inception up to four such children (there being "no extra 
charge" beyond the fourth) in the form of a reduction or elimination 
of their FRS. Persons with relatively high incomes would pay extra 
for each subsequent child via a higher fertility tax bill. 
It is reasonable to believe that, to some unpredictable degree, 
persons who don't really want, or who don't much want, an addi-
tional child above their present or above some future number of 
children would be more effectively deterred than would otherwise be 
the case from conceiving that additional child (or from ever conceiv-
ing any children at all if they didn't much want any?) because of 
the "extra charge" imposed. Clearly, though, persons who would 
much rather have more children than to have more affluence, than 
to be able to buy premium college educations for all or most of a 
fewer number of children, than to be able to give more to charity, 
or than anything else, would not be deterred by the proposed modest 
extra economic advantage in fertility self-restraint. But it might not 
be necessary that they should be! The hope in augmenting existing 
economic disincentives to fertility is that the effect amongst those 
who don't especially want more children, or, in some cases, don't 
especially want any children, will be sufficient to avoid an expan-
sionary rate of fertility for the population as a whole while allowing 
those who very much want children or more children to have them. 
The preceding does not mean that the moral-social duty to limit 
population growth would cease to be a factor in a person's decision 
to refrain from creating children or more children. For one thing, 
there is simply no way of knowing whether or not the combined 
impetus of economic and other "amoral" fertility disincentives ex-
isting at any given time is fully (or "mostly") freeing concep-
tion/nonconception decisionmaking from any consideration of a 
moral duty not to have children or more children because of the 
global threat of overpopulation. (Doubtless some people would in-
sist that more children are conceived because of a superego-
imposed, traditional moral duty to procreate than are not conceived 
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because of obedience of ZPG preachments. Granted that such was 
indisputably true in the past and is still true today in some societies, 
it hardly seems to be generally the case in today's America.) Though 
believing that an augmenting of existing economic incentive for 
fertility self-restraint can reduce excessive ZPG moral pressure on 
those susceptible to it and thus share the burden of fertility self-
sacrifice more fairly, I also tentatively hold the following expecta-
tion as to the relevant future: With ecologically reckless rates of 
global population growth remaining a major danger for the foreseea-
ble future, with human beings' strong instinctual drive for reproduc-
tion likely to remain about as deeply ingrained as it now still is, and 
with children still being the greatest invention (joy giver) before, 
during, and since sliced bread, a structure of economic disincentive 
to fertility strong enough to obviate all need for morally-grounded 
fertility self-restraint will not be a practical possibility. Having said 
this, I must also concede that, as with most, if not all, population-
related predictions, there is at least a fifty percent chance of mine 
being wrong. 
There is another possible advantage in raising the price of parent-
hood. Assuming adequate accessibility to a variety of modern con-
traceptive and sterilization techniques, the FT and FRS would 
likely encourage people to make more careful and considered deci-
sions about whether or not to conceive children before actually 
doing so. Again, there is no predicting the extent to which this would 
occur. Nor is there an accurate way to measure the intangible social 
gain that would result from people more carefully deciding whether 
they really want children before they decide to have them. However, 
virtually everything we know about child development in general, 
and about "mostly-not-wanted children" compared with "mostly-
wanted children" in particular, suggests that if decisions about pro-
creation were made more carefully in terms of the potential parents' 
own wants, the human community would be a much happier organi-
zation. 
It of course can be argued that any augmentation of economic 
incentive for fertility self-restraint would tend to encourage abor-
tions. However, the argument is sheer nonsense. Anything resem-
bling the modest scale of economic rewards and costs proposed is 
not going to affect a pregnant woman's willingness or unwillingness 
to take so emotionally agonizing a step as that of having her own 
child aborted. Actually, to the extent that an FT-FRS system en-
couraged child planning decisions before the fact, it could even 
reduce the incidence of abortions. The argument that the FT-FRS 
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system might encourage abortions could be additionally met (a) by 
treating a deliberately aborted fetus as a living child for purposes 
of the tax and the FRS, and/or (b) by providing that a mother's 
surrender of an unwanted newborn for legal adoption would exclude 
the infant from the number of children legally attributed to the 
natural mother. Suggestion b is much the more preferable of the 
two. Suggestion a is of questionable merit in that, as with criminal 
abortion statutes, its enactment could possibly encourage some per-
sons who have decided on an abortion to get or attempt a furtive, 
nonprofessional one, with the accompanying hazards to the life and 
health of the mother. Also, suggestion a raises significant constitu-
tional questions.43 
B. The FT and FRS - Economically Discriminatory? 
The economic justice or injustice of the FT and FRS system is 
likely to be questioned from at least three different perspectives. 
First: Households with above-average incomes would likely object 
to the idea of paying a tax for having any subsequent children when 
covered women with below-average incomes would get paid at least 
some fertility restraint subsidy even though they were to have as 
many as three subsequent children. The answer to this objection is 
that an approach which taxes the relatively affluent and subsidizes 
the relatively non affluent is the most feasible, if not the only, way 
to structure a system of pecuniary incentive for fertility self-
restraint that (a) has a fair chance of being substantially self-
financing and (b) increases the cost of having each of at least four 
future children to parents and prospective parents within a wide 
range of incomes such that, in crude theory at least, the cost in-
crease is about as affordable for parents and prospective parents (or 
at least for similarly aged parents and prospective parents) in one 
income group as in another. It is hardly surprising that a program 
that can increase the price of children at virtually all incomes and 
•• See generally Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A 
society genuinely concerned about the tragedy of abortion should seek to provide effective 
access to contraceptive information and procedures to all its citizens. Doing that ought not 
imply that casual sexual intercourse is perfectly okay or perfectly not okay. It ought only 
imply that we very much want couples to want to be creating a human being if such is what 
they are in fact helping to happen. 
Suggestion b would, of course, apply to the situation where the mother was a rape victim 
and, for religious or other reasons, chose not to have an abortion. In such a case, one hopes, 
for the sake of both the child and the woman, that she would surrender the child for adoption 
unless she really does want to keep it. 
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yet doesn't at all reduce the economically poorest family's existing 
freedom to have an above-average number of children should super-
ficially appear to favor the lower income family! Despite said ap-
pearance, the system is intended to be neutral in its likely compara-
tive effect on rich people's fertility versus poor people's fertility.44 
Second: Americans at the bottom of the income ladder might well 
feel that it is unfair to be proposing, contingently or otherwise, to 
pay them not to have lots of children when, as of this writing at 
least, we have not yet enabled every American man, woman, and 
child to receive a minimally adequate level of material subsistence. 
In view of our capability of accomplishing the just stated goals, the 
complaint is a justifiable one. But, contrary to the standard rheto-
ric, the answer is not necessarily for the nation to increase its al-
ready spiralling social welfare budget. A prime example of the kind 
of thing we instead ought to do would be to replace a food stamp 
system whose major impact is to subsidize the suppliers of over-
priced food, junk food, and nonfood, with a less Camelot-sounding 
effort that, unlike the status quo and its apparently imminent "all 
cash" successor, would provide low-income households with the 
basic nutrition they need for life, health, and their children's proper 
growth. Given a bona fide effort toward giving everyone real access 
to the (admittedly unglamoroud) necessities of life and basic health 
on the part of any society that, like ours, can afford it, and given 
the lack of "economic fertility discrimination" discussed in Section 
IV C, infra, the use of economic fertility disincentives is in no sense 
an enemy of those with low incomes. 
Third: Though not necessarily for the same reasons, high-, low-, 
and middle-income groups might each object to the fact that, both 
with respect to families with incomes in the IT range and with 
.. In view of existing and expected economic constraints facing most families with (or later 
to have) an above· average number of children and a below-average income, neutrality does 
not seem likely to require extending the FRS to cover these families beyond the fourth child. 
Such a course would increase the program's cost and/or even increase fertility since persons 
could produce four or five children and still be rewarded for fertility self-restraint. However, 
for families whose income is above the applicable national average, there is considerable 
economic freedom to have five or more children, with said freedom being greater to the extent 
that a family's income exceeds said average. Hence, neutrality would seem to recommend 
taxing parents with above-average incomes for all additional children, with the amount of 
tax for any particular number of children varying directly with the amount of a family's 
income in excess of the applicable U.S. average. This, roughly, is the proposed initial struc-
ture. If it should prove discriminatory in favor of lower income families or of any other income 
group, we could attempt corrective changes. The question of economic fertility discrimination 
is more fully discussed in Section IV C, infra. 
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respect to families with incomes in the FRS range, under the pro-
posed initial FT-FRS structure the dollar amount of fertility tax or 
subsidy in any year for any given number of children would be 
proportionately smaller the more closely a family's income approxi-
mated the applicable dividing line between FRS entitlement and 
FT liability. Under that proposed structure, FT -FRS dividing lines 
would initially be set at the preceding year's applicable U.S. aver-
age incomes. 45 For families whose income was precisely equal to the 
applicable dividing line, the suggested structure would neither 
award them a subsidy nor charge them a tax that year - no matter 
how many, or how few, children they had. The justification for this 
is obvious. For a given number of children on which relatively higher 
income groups are taxed and relatively lower income groups are 
subsidized (a strategy justified in my answer to objection number 
one), it is necessary that there be a break-even point somewhere on 
the income scale, i. e., an income at which a family would net zero 
dollars from the tax and subsidy structure, if the structure is to 
avoid creating disincentives for earning income at some income 
point or points. Thus, for example, if having three children entitled 
mothers in families with a $10,000 annual income to a $50 FRS but 
required similarly structured families with a $10,001 annual income 
to pay a $50 FT, earning the last dollar of income would cost these 
latter families $100, a net disincentive of $99. The concern not to 
undermine income-earning incentive at any point also requires that 
the FRS decrease gradually toward the break-even point on the 
family income scale; likewise for the fertility tax. 46 
Admittedly, it is not necessary that an FT-FRS break-even point 
be set at or near "average income," however defined. And each 
break-even point could be set at successively lower incomes for each 
increase in a family's childbearing count, thereby further augment-
ing the degree of economic disincentive to high fertility. However, 
as to any given number of children, setting the break-even point at 
or near some plausibly relevant societal average has a justifiable, 
though question-begging, twin appeal: first, setting the point much 
below "average income" and thus extracting a fertility tax from 
" Using U.S. average income(s) of each preceding rather than of each current year is 
suggested merely as an administrative convenience. For that purpose, a two-year lag would 
be even better, though some adjustment for estimated inflation would be called for. 
" However, that concern would not seem to prevent our placing somewhat higher FT 
and/or FRS marginal rates upon income dollars near a break-even point than we were placing 
upon income dollars farther away. 
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some households with incomes well below the average seems unnec-
essarily onerous; and second, setting the point much above "average 
income" and thus subsidizing for fertility restraint some women 
with incomes well above the average seems unnecessarily expensive. 
Looking at probable outcomes, the lack of a fertility tax or sub-
sidy at or near average U.S. income(s), be it "all age" or by age 
bracket, in any given year and the existence of a very low tax or 
subsidy on nearby incomes would not likely result in middle-income 
persons' fertility significantly exceeding that of upper- or lower-
income households. The just stated expectation is based on at least 
two grounds. In the first place, a family's income picture seldom 
remains constant. Rare is the household that knows that its future 
income will remain at, or virtually at, any absolute or relative level. 
Middle-income couples entering the childbearing years would thus 
be cognizant of the high likelihood that, sooner or later, they would 
be liable for some nontrivial FT payments and/or entitled to some 
nontrivial amounts of FRS's. In the second place, the sum total of 
fertility disincentives, economic and otherwise, in the U.S. already 
seems to be highest amongst persons in the middle-income range. n 
Though there are likely many reasons for this phenomenon, one 
reason would seem to be that, in an industrial society, relative to 
family income, children tend to be most expensive for middle-
income families. Whether because of external social pressures, or 
their own internal values, or both, middle-class parents tend to 
spend a relatively high percentage of their income on their chil-
dren's formal and informal education (college, music lessons, sum-
mer camps, etc.) and on other child-related expenditures beyond 
the physical necessities. Wealthy parents spend for these things too, 
but with considerably more income left over for other wants. Low-
income parents certainly sacrifice for their children, but are seldom 
able to do so at the pecuniary level and in the style typical of the 
middle class. Further, public assistance tends to reduce the cost of 
children mainly at lower incomes. 
If, despite the above two considerations, the FT and FRS struc-
17 Though U.S. fertility does seem to be lowest among middle-income persons, probably 
the most striking aspect of the fertility picture as to different income groups in the U.S. is 
that differences in fertility rates between these groups are anything but striking. Apparently 
(and unsurprisingly), nonpecuniary considerations playa nontrivial role in couples' how-
many-children decision making. For raw U.S. fertility data according to income, see U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SUBJECT REpORTS, FINAL REPORT PC(2)3A, CENSUS OF THE POPULATION: 
WOMEN BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN (1970), at tables 50,52. 
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ture caused fertility to bulge at middle incomes, adjustment to that 
structure could be made. 48 
C. Economic Fertility Discrimination - A Closer Look 
As suggested previously, the desirability of an economic incentive 
approach to limiting fertility is highly dependent upon that ap-
proach not resulting in substantial discrimination according to in-
come and wealth. Rushing in where angels probably would, and 
perhaps even should, fear to tread, I shall foolishly attempt to sug-
gest the basic components of economic justice in any society's use 
of economic incentive to encourage a lower overall fertility: 
1. All income groups should have essentially equal and ad-
quate access to contraceptive information, procedures, and 
devices, including permanent, or if available, reversible sterili-
zation and short-term (nonsterilizing) options. Presumably, 
the inherent justice in this requirement speaks for itself - safe 
ground even for fearful angels. 
2. Child mortality and "adults-of-childbearing-age mortal-
ity" rates ought not vary significantly between different in-
come groups. Whether or not a society needs to reduce its fertil-
ity, the just stated goal is fundamental - also safe for angels 
social justice. However, its achievement in many societies will 
require herculean efforts in improving the diet and health care 
afforded the economically disadvantaged. Until those tasks are 
accomplished, minimal justice requires that economically de-
prived groups be able to compensate for their relatively higher 
pre-childbearing death rates with correspondingly higher birth 
rates, to the extent necessary for them to beget future genera-
tions on an aggregate parity with society's more fortunate 
members, without incurring any social stigma in doing so. 
3. Subject to the above two requisites, and henceforth beyond 
angelic safety, we can say that a society's encouragement of 
lower fertility is functioning amongst its citizenry with reasona-
'" For example, the break·even point(s) for zero children and/or one child could be raised 
above average income(s). And/or the break-even point(s) for three or more children could be 
placed below average income(s). The former change would pay an FRS to some low-fertility 
women with above-average incomes; the latter change would levy an FT on some high-
fertility families with below-average incomes. However, it probably would be sufficient, and 
more desirable, to leave the break-even points at "average income" and raise marginal FT 
and/or FRS per child percentage rates on income dollars near break-even income levels and/or 
lower those rates on income dollars more remote from break-even incomes. 
336 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:301 
ble economic fairness so long as lifetime fertility does not there-
after appear to be varying significantly amongst contemporar-
ies according to their income, exclusive of the probable extent 
to which fertility (and the number of children individuals think 
they will have) is itself affecting their acquisition of income. 
(Limiting our direct attention to income as opposed to income 
and wealth is defensible on two grounds. First, having to cope 
explicitly with three variables, income, wealth, and fertility, 
rather than the two, income and fertility, adds an extremely 
burdensome, if not crippling, complexity to an already complex 
problem. Second, the substantial nonoccurrence offertility dis-
crimination with respect to income would substantially dimin-
ish, if not eliminate, any striking degree of fertility discrimina-
tion with respect to accumulated wealth.) 
Doubtless there are those who, from one perspective or another, 
would object to the inclusion of the third criterion of economic fertil-
ity justice. But it seems inherently impossible that any objection 
could include an equalitarian-compatible justification for why a 
society should encourage persons with greater or lesser incomes to 
propagate the next generation at a rate different from others. If 
lifetime fertility in a society does, in fact, differ from one income 
group to another exclusive of any effect of fertility on income, such 
is precisely the encouragement the society, intentionally or uninten-
tionally, is giving. 
Despite its (I believe) essential merit, requisite number three is 
not without its problems. First, for obvious reasons previously 
mentioned, the locus of fertility data must be the female members 
of the society. But how does one equate the income of an unmarried, 
self-supporting female with the income of a married woman sup-
ported by her working husband (or with the income of a married 
woman who supports her husband, or with the income of a married 
couple who both work) in ascertaining whether fertility is varying 
with income? Probably the least unfair solution to this problem 
would be to divide women into two categories, (1) married or cohabi-
ting, and (2) unmarried, separated, or deserted, and to look for, 
and be only concerned with, variances in fertility between different 
incomes within each category. 49 
.. If there is an issue as to "fertility fairness" between these or similar categories, I leave 
its resolution to others. Likewise as to fertility justice in societies where polygamy is an 
accepted practice. 
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Another more difficult problem, alluded to in the statement of the 
third economic fertility justice requisite, is this: Though one's life-
time fertility may well be affected by one's income (and wealth), 
one's income (and wealth) may well be affected by one's expected 
and actual fertility. As regards any two income levels, the latter 
effect could push toward either a positive or a negative correlation 
between fertility and income, perhaps with contrary tendencies 
working at once. 
The tendency toward a positive yet perfectly justifiable fertility 
and income correlation could happen in at least two ways. First, it 
is highly probable that, given two groups of persons with equal or 
similar income-getting prospects, the group with more present or 
planned dependents would tend to exert greater income-getting ef-
fort (work longer hours, or take on two jobs instead of one, or be 
more willing to do distasteful-but-Iucrative work, or whatever). Sec-
ond, public assistance payments often increase in amount according 
to the number of dependents in a household. Accordingly, in most 
societies, there would likely be some tendency toward a positive 
correlation between fertility and income that was due not to the 
greater propensity of relatively higher income-getters to have more 
children, but was instead due to the greater propensity of parents 
with more children to support to strive for more income, and to the 
general tendency of public assistance to provide more subsidized 
income to high-fertility households.50 
At any and all points along the income scale the positive effect of 
fertility on income-getting might be partly, wholly, or more than 
50 The positive correlation tendency would likely be most apparent around the lower end 
of the income scale. Public assistance payments are unsurprisingly more prevalent within this 
general income range. Also, although there would likely be people who had no or few children 
in order not to have to exert so much income-earning effort scattered all along the income 
scale, those who had no children in order to be as free of income-earning responsibilities as 
possible would tend to cluster at the very bottom of the adult income ladder, where, unlike 
at all other adult income levels, they would not be joined by persons with children or lots of 
children - since even officially impoverished with-children families tend to have more total 
income than patronless beachcombers or patronless semi-beachcombers. 
The tendency of college, professional, and graduate students during their in-school years 
both to have fewer children (or no children) and to receive less income than those who begin 
full-time work out of high school should also contribute to a positive income/fertility correla-
tion for the time between ages 18 and 25 or so. However, as the in-school-longer groups 
eventually begin their careers, they can be expected to narrow the lifetime fertility "gap" 
between them and their high-school-educated contemporaries. If the gap is not fully or nearly 
closed, it may result, since college and professional graduates have tended to have a higher 
lifetime income, in a negative income/fertility correlation that violates the goal of economic 
nondiscrimination. 
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offset by (a) the unemployment, whole or partial, (b) the reduced 
access to higher paying work in the short run, and (c) the deferred 
or lost educational opportunities of mothers (and/or fathers) with 
young and even not-so-young children, all of which would tend to 
push the data toward a negative correlation between income and 
fertility.51 As with its opposite discussed in the preceding paragraph, 
this tendency would not make the society's efforts to encourage a 
lower overall fertility economically discriminatory. For again, it is 
fertility that would here be affecting income, not income affecting 
fertility. 
Why is all this such a problem? There is no way we could be sure 
of the extent to which fertility was positively and/or negatively af-
fecting income at any point or points along the income scale. And 
our lack of assurance here would be a nontrivial impediment to 
ascertaining and correcting real economic discrimination in the so~ 
ciety's effort to lower and contain fertility, for such discrimination 
only exists to the extent that inequality of income, including ine-
quality of expected income, is causing unequal rates of fertility 
among different income groups. To attempt to remedy either a posi-
tive or a negative fertility/income correlation to the extent such was 
due to the effect of fertility on income would thus be nonsensical 
and probably even unjust. 
Despite what has thus far been said, data correlating projected 
lifetime fertility with income would be highly useful in attempting 
continually to ascertain whether or not society's effort to lower and 
contain fertility was discriminating against any income group or 
groups. For, though we can never know the extent of the effect of 
fertility on income-getting at various incomes, we could make suffi-
ciently informed and intelligent guesses so as to interpret the fertil-
ity/income correlation data in reasonably rational fashion. 52 If the 
,,' At lower incomes, the above effect would be significantly mitigated by welfare and/or 
other public assistance granted to the at-home mother and her children. 
,,2 An alternative or supplemental approach to assessing fertility and actual income correla-
tions would be to correlate fertility with income expectancy (a person's income-earning pros-
pects based on a number of relevant factors). This approach is also not without its problems: 
One's income-getting potential is actually dependent upon a host of variables - including 
health, appearance, personality, physical strength, I.Q., grades in school, educational oppor-
tunity, educational attainment, parental and personal connections, union and/or professional 
memberships, licenses and franchises, and, in any capitalistic society, economic net worth 
and access to commercial credit. Obviously, the relative importance of these factors varies 
with a person's age and stage in life. An enthusiastic attempt to gather and deal with such 
data would be both expensive and privacy-impinging. And one's income-getting prospects are 
also not totally immune from the effects of one's planned and actual fertility. At best, a less 
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variances in fertility between different income groups were insub-
stantial, we probably would and probably should be content with 
the FT-FRS structure as it was then functioning. However, ifthere 
were substantial variances in projected lifetime fertility among con-
temporaries constituting different income groups, and if those vari-
ances did not appear to be the result of the effects of fertility on 
income, then the prospective modification of the relative amount of 
fertility disincentives present at the income level where fertility was 
above or below the societal average should be attempted. 
D. The FT and FRS - A Fairly Critical Look 
Unsurprisingly, there is no totally desirable social strategy for 
getting people to have fewer children than, if left solely to their own 
private 'druthers, they would like to have. The expedient of aug-
menting existing fertility economic disincentives is no exception. 
Although I favor the specific FT-FRS structure previously outlined 
as a "contingency plan" for use should U.S. fertility appear to be 
exceeding immigration-adjusted replacement fertility, I feel obliged 
to point out the chief disadvantages of that plan or of any similar 
means of encouraging greater fertility self-restraint. 
First disadvantage (and probably not applicable to the U.S., at 
least for some time): In nations where starvation is an ordinary 
happening or an ever-likely possibility, the difference between gov-
ernment attempting to lower fertility via economic incentive and 
government attempting to lower fertility via compulsory steriliza-
tion of anyone who exceeded or reached some per person childbear-
ing limit would be mostly one of form rather than of substance. 
Obviously, this is not a disadvantage of the incentive approach in 
comparison with coercive fertility control, but it is a virtual nega-
tion of any moral advantage of the incentive approach over the 
coercive approach to fertility limitation in any society with a below 
subsistence or bare subsistence economy. In such a society, any 
advantages of the incentive approach over the explicitly coercive 
one would have to do with relative public acceptance and feasibility. 
Second disadvantage: Augmenting existing economic incentive 
for fertility self-restraint would generally heighten to some degree 
than comprehensive look at income-getting expectancies during and prior to the usual child-
bearing years and a correlation of that data with fertility rates !'ould aid in interpreting the 
fertility and income correlations. In other words, we would be at least a little better able to 
distinguish income affecting fertility from fertility affecting income. 
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the disparity between the material living standard accorded to chil-
dren of low-fertility parents and that accorded to children of high-
fertility parents in instances where both households had the same 
or a similar total income. In addition, it would often heighten the 
aforementioned disparity in instances where the low-fertility house-
hold had the somewhat to substantially higher income (though here 
the approach of imposing FT's upon relatively high incomes and 
granting FRS's to relatively low incomes, and the approach of vary-
ing the tax or subsidy amount according to income, would each 
often have the opposite effect, thus reducing said disparity), and it 
would sometimes heighten the aforementioned disparity even in 
instances where the high-fertility household had the somewhat 
higher income. In other words, a fertility tax and/or fertility self-
restraint subsidy, though levied on and/or awarded to the parent(s), 
is very likely going to affect the economic situation of the children. 
(Were it not to do so, the tax and subsidy might lose any real chance 
of restraining parents' fertility: The belief that one can better pro-
vide for a few children than for a lot of children is surely a strong 
consideration in family planning.) Perhaps if sufficient emphasis 
were put on such matters as achieving minimal educational equality 
between high-income and low-income school districts and affording 
adequate nutrition to all children, any increase in the rather special 
type of economic inequality described above would not be of mo-
mentous consequence. Quite probably most people would consider 
that increase to be far less repugnant than our ever having to insti-
tute a legally enforceable per person fertility maximum. 
Third disadvantage: Even in the long run the FT-FRS system 
might not be substantially self-financing. It could turn out that 
levying a tax upon relatively higher income people's childbearing 
was a much more effective technique for restraining fertility than 
awarding people with relatively lower incomes an FRS at a per child 
rate comparable to the FT tax rate. It could, of course, happen that 
the converse was the case, i.e., that the FRS was more effective than 
the FT at a similar per child rate. If either disparity occurred, mean-
ing that fertility appeared to be either higher or lower amongst 
persons with above-average incomes than amongst persons with 
below-average incomes, exclusive of the estimated effects of fertility 
on income, there would be a situation of economic discrimination 
in want of correction. The former situation, FT more effective than 
FRS, will be dealt with here because it could cause long-term diffi-
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culties in financing the system,5a 
We could attempt to correct any significant "relative deficiency" 
in fertility amongst persons with above-average incomes by prospec-
tively making one of three changes in the FT-FRS system. If the 
nation's overall fertility were still believed to be too high, the dollar 
value of FRS's to be awarded to women with below-average incomes 
could be increased, hopefully avoiding an increase great enough to 
undermine income-earning incentive unacceptably. If overall fertil-
ity were believed to be too low, the rate of fertility tax levied on 
persons with above-average incomes could be decreased. Or, if the 
overall fertility rate seemed essentially satisfactory, the FRS's could 
be increased and the FT's decreased, though each more slightly 
than in the first two cases. 
Though we might thereby sooner or later find a balance between 
the fertility tax and the FRS capable of achieving a fairly equal 
fertility rate amongst persons of widely varying income-making 
abilities, the total dollar value of annual FRS's could exceed fertility 
tax revenues by a sizeable amount year after year (and in this case 
without any plausible expectancy of later recoupment). If such a 
deficit were to occur, one way to eliminate it or at least reduce it 
would be to lower the IT-FRS breakeven points for some or all 
numbers of children. But, since this remedy would necessarily mean 
levying a fertility tax upon relatively large households with below-
average incomes, and perhaps doing so to relatively large house-
holds with well-below-average incomes, we would not want to use 
it unrestrainedly. 
In view of the concentration of below-average incomes in the eld-
erly years, another way to remedy or lessen the aforementioned 
deficit situation would be to end persons' membership in the FT-
FRS program at or near the conclusion of the usual income-earning 
years, say, at age 65. In conjunction with use of "all-adult-ages" 
U.S. average incomes at break-even points, the system would thus 
;:, The converse situation could also pose its own difficulties. The most obvious problem is 
the possible need for an FT rate so high that it would seriously threaten income-earning 
incentive amongst high-fertility persons with above-average incomes. However, there is some 
extra leeway for a rather high marginal FT rate. If the FRS proved more effective than the 
FT, FT revenues would, at least after the starting decades, be exceeding FRS expenditures. 
Federal income tax marginal rates on above-average incomes could thus be reduced to the 
somewhat guesstimable extent that the probable loss in annual income tax revenues would 
not likely exceed expected annual FT-FRS surpluses beyond those merely due to the earlier 
discussed "intermediate phasing-in" conditions. (A similar strategy for another eventuality 
is discussed in note 55, infra.) 
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be able to save a great deal more in discontinued FRS payments 
than it would lose in discontinued FT revenues. But even if lifetime 
vesting was abolished prospectively (as minimal fair play and hope-
fully minimal legality would require), for the reasons discussed ear-
lier in Section TIl C, the resulting loss in desirability (or perhaps 
better stated, in social justice) would be nontrivial. 
Another remedy, which could be employed with or without either 
of the prior two - and which might even be necessary in addition 
to both - would, of course, be to raise enough tax dollars from other 
sources to make up the deficit. However, if recurrent, sizeable FT-
FRS annual operating losses were encountered, our continued in-
sistence on achieving a nonexpansionary and economically nondis-
criminatory fertility outcome purely via individual decisionmaking 
could become morally questionable (or worse). Given the compel-
ling global needs that could be served by the monies used to cover 
the FT-FRS deficits, it just might be that the cost of preserving 
unlimited voluntarism in fertility was proving too high. 54 
Fourth disadvantage: It may not be possible to design a fertility 
tax and subsidy system that would be economically nondiscrimi-
natory in actual operation. As previously stated, the tax and/or 
subsidy could be prospectively adjusted for different incomes in 
.. Though it would apply here only in part, the same point can be made with respect to 
the FT-FRS system even if it proved entirely self-supporting. Income-based fertility taxation 
of above-average-income households would reduce whatever leeway exists for increased in-
come taxation (and other forms of taxation) of these affluent families and individuals, taxa-
tion whose revenues could be put to other worthwhile uses than paying FRS's. However, it is 
extremely likely that a good portion of (actual and potential) above-average-income earners 
with several dependents to support would vigorously seek income at combined (income tax 
plus their FT) marginal tax rates high enough to undermine the income-getting incentive of 
persons with similar income-getting opportunities but having very few or no dependents 
(provided, of course, that any combined marginal tax rate was leBB than confiscatory). In 
other words, some and perhaps even much of the revenue from the fertility tax would likely 
be over and above the additional monies realizable from, instead of having an income-based 
FT, increasing the income (and/or other) tax on more-or-leBB-above-average-income taxpay-
ers to its maximum revenue producing structure (whatever that unknown rate structure 
might be). Even the "not otherwise tax raisable" portion of the FT revenues could, of course, 
theoretically be spent on worthy projects other than paying FRS's. However, choosing a 
market mechanism to limit fertility among persons with above-average incomes while choos-
ing some entirely different method for the rest of society is not a very tenable option. There 
is also the possibility of using a fertility tax for all income levels and thus being able to use 
all the resulting revenues, net of administrative costs, for earth-caring and urgent human 
needs. However, I could not envision such a system that would appear to offer any plausible 
hope of discouraging population-expanding fertility with substantial equality among income 
groups and without either being economically oppreBBive to high-fertility households with low 
income, likely demolishing income-getting incentive among parents with high incomes, or 
having both these disadvantages. 
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quest of a structure that produced a similar lifetime fertility rate 
amongst contemporaries at all levels of income, exclusive of the 
estimated effects of fertility on anyone's income. The assessment of 
the degree to which this goal was being met and the prospective 
readjustment of the FT and FRS rates, when and if indicated, would 
have to be an ongoing process. But there would be limits to the 
range of adjustments that could be made. As noted earlier, the need 
to preserve adequate income-earning incentive argues against sud-
den jumps in the amount of an FT or FRS between nearby income 
levels. Another constraint is the wish not to levy an FT on large 
families that could not afford it. And, in any society that uses per-
sonal economic reward as a means of getting people to produce or 
to help produce needed and wanted goods and services (i.e., most 
societies), it would be undesirable for FT or FRS rates to be so high 
as to destroy income-earning incentive at any income level, high, 
medium, or low. Since, in the U.S., the FT would be levied in 
addition to the federal income tax and the FRS would be granted 
in addition to other public assistance, the danger is not illusory. If 
substantial disparities in lifetime fertility between different income 
groups could not be prospectively overcome by feasible adjustments 
in the FT and FRS structure, meaning that significant economic 
fertility discrimination could not reasonably be eliminated, we 
would face an unhappy three-pronged choice. We would have to 
either perpetuate the economic discrimination or let our population 
grow its merry way (and still quite possibly perpetuate economic 
fertility discrimination), or, if fertility was still unacceptably high, 
prepare for the unwelcome advent of some sort of per person fertility 
quota. 
Fifth disadvantage: Last, but certainly not least, an acceptable 
incentive approach to fertility limitation may not be able to do the 
job. An FT-FRS structure that (a) doesn't require massive general 
revenue support, (b) avoids serious economic discrimination in ac-
tual practice, and (c) uses tax and subsidy rates that do not seri-
ously undermine income-earning incentive, may not augment exist-
ing fertility disincentives sufficiently to stay a population-
expanding level of fertility in the United States or in any other 
nation that might employ the FT-FRS approach. 55 
55 The following might be a last ditch attempt to give the FT-FRS concept adequate 
fertility-limiting "clout": Assume that per child FT and FRS marginal rates had been in-
creased to the point that, when combined with welfare and other public assistance reduction 
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* * * * 
I do not view any of the possible ways that the IT-FRS system 
might fail and/or cause difficulties as reason not to try it should our 
fertility appear to be exceeding immigration-adjusted replacement. 
Any program of nonprohibitive cost with a decent chance of fairly 
and humanely thwarting irresponsible population growth without 
suppressing individual fertility freedom is, if and when needed, 
worth our try. 
rates based on income received, for low-income families, and when combined with federal 
income tax rates for all other households, the IT and FRS could not be further increased 
without almost certainly undermining income-getting incentive to an unacceptable degree. 
Assume also that the then existing IT-FRS rates were not keeping the nation's level of 
reproduction within the goal of not exceeding immigration-adjusted replacement fertility. 
Assume, finally, that population-expanding fertility was occurring to about the same extent 
throughout the income spectrum. In short, the general desire, what the economist calls 
aggregate demand, for having babies was greater than thus far feasible economic disincen-
tives had been able to limit sufficiently. The feasible level of IT-FRS fertility disincentives 
could then be increased by doing the following: First, lower the FT-FRS break-even points 
to incomes substantially below the applicable U.S. averages, a revenue-increasing move. 
Second, lower federal income tax rates, likely a revenue-decreasing move. Third, lower the 
benefit reduction rates by which welfare or other existing income maintenance payments are 
reduced by other household income, a move likely to increase government expenditures. 
Fourth, then, with lower income tax and public assistance marginal rates making it possible 
to do so, increase FRS per child subsidy rates and IT per child tax rates somewhat - without 
demolishing income-getting incentive. With a fair amount of luck and sophisticated guessti-
mating in setting the relative amounts of each of the foregoing changes - and perhaps some 
trial and error - the total package should not result in a drastically changed combined 
revenue and expenditure situation for the government. And, as to the point of it all, there 
would be at least the chance that the new level of fertility disincentive would be sufficient to 
actualize the nation's fertility-limiting goal. Under this scheme, the imposition of the fertility 
tax on the lower-middle income range of households would be offset by their paying a lower 
federal income tax, and in some cases, by their receiving income maintenance payments at 
an income that formerly would have disqualified them. But, obviously, this offsetting effect 
would only be an equal or nearly equal bargain for this income group taken as a whole. Within 
the group, a heavier net tax burden would fall on those who, in the future, have the most 
children, reflecting the higher price of parenthood then applicable to all income groups. 
Provided that greater fertility disincentive in any income group did not translate into genuine 
material need, into poor health that could have been prevented, and/or into severe educa-
tional deprivation for the children of high-fertility households, society would probably be 
paying the least evil price for achieving, if the new rates succeed, the benefit of an 
immigration-adjusted replacement level offertility. If, however, it became apparent that our 
population-limiting imperative could not be fulfilled on a voluntary basis without upping the 
ante to a degree that would foster the above harms, we would then have the unhappy task of 
deciding whether compulsory sterilization or the continuation of population-expanding fertil-
ity rates was the lesser affront to human dignity. Even if we reluctantly opted for the former, 
there would likely be real benefit in continuing a nonharmful degree of fertility-limiting 
economic incentive: Maintaining the IT-FRS system could make compulsory sterilization 
unnecessary except for those who thereafter had a considerably greater number of children 
than would, apart from multiple births, be permitted anyone were a per person quota ap-
proach to replace the IT and FRS in toto. Were it to lessen to any substantial degree the 
loss of individual reproductive freedom, the FT-FRS ought still be a welcome institution. 
